Institutional Reforms in California Groundwater Law by Garner, Eric L. et al.
McGeorge Law Review
Volume 25 | Issue 3 Article 6
1-1-1994
Institutional Reforms in California Groundwater
Law
Eric L. Garner
Best, Best & Krieger
Michelle Ouellette
Best, Best & Krieger
Richard L. Sharff Jr.
Best, Best & Krieger
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.pacific.edu/mlr
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals and Law Reviews at Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
McGeorge Law Review by an authorized editor of Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact mgibney@pacific.edu.
Recommended Citation
Eric L. Garner, Michelle Ouellette & Richard L. Sharff Jr., Institutional Reforms in California Groundwater Law, 25 Pac. L. J. 1021
(1994).
Available at: https://scholarlycommons.pacific.edu/mlr/vol25/iss3/6




Richard L. Sharff, Jr.***
I. INTRODUCTION
Allocation of groundwater in California has long been a difficult
problem. The history of water use in California has been to pump
groundwater until it becomes scarce and then to develop a supply of
supplemental imported water. This happened in the City of Los Angeles,
where three thousand artesian wells disappeared in thirty years as a result
of overpumping. 1 The development of the Owens Valley and Colorado
River supplies were designed to offset the deficit created by
overpumping.2 Similarly, groundwater levels in the Central Valley had
declined precipitously until the Central Valley Project brought additional
supplies for agricultural use.3
Although groundwater problems are not new, they are more important
today than ever. Groundwater currently contributes approximately 16.6
million acre-feet annually in an attempt to meet California's water needs.4
The rapid urban growth and lengthy drought experienced in the past ten
years have led to the increased withdrawal of groundwater to meet water
needs, causing a lowering of groundwater levels and leading to a severe
groundwater overdraft problem. Overdraft occurs whenever groundwater
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1. THE MEImOPOLITAN WATER DISTRCr, HISTORY AND FIRST ANNUAL REPORT 17 (1939).
2. NORIS HUNDLEY, JR., THE GREAT THIRST 119-200 (1992).
3. Id. at 235.
4. CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF WATER RESOURCES, CALIFORNIA WATER: LOOKING TO THE FUTURE,
BULLETIN No. 160-87, 31 (1987) [hereinafter CALIFORNIA WATER: LOOKING TO THE FUTURE].
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extractions increase or the withdrawable maximum decreases to the point
where any surplus ends, or both.5 State groundwater basins are estimated
to be annually overdrafted by two million acre-feet.6 Historically,
overdraft problems have been mitigated by the importation of supplemental
water through large water development projects. 7 This alternative is less
viable now because of the higher cost of such projects and the
environmental constraints on their construction.'
Water quality issues also affect groundwater availability. Many
groundwater basins have been polluted by toxic chemicals used in
manufacturing and agricultural applications and cannot be utilized for
domestic purposes.9 Groundwater supplies are also being viewed as a
source of water for transfers to meet growing urban needs. Coupled with
these limitations and requirements is the recognition of the need to allocate
sufficient water to meet environmental needs. The use of groundwater
supplies for environmental needs is an additional limitation on the
availability of groundwater supplies for consumptive use.
The time is long past for comprehensive groundwater regulation in
California. The failure of Californians to act will not make the problem
disappear. Rather, as with the State's failure to comprehensively address
water issues in the San Francisco Bay/Sacramento-San Joaquin Delta
region, t° it will constitute an open invitation to the federal government
to become involved either directly or through the application of federal
laws such as the Endangered Species Act.
California groundwater law as it currently exists is perhaps best
summarized as the right to pump as much water as possible until one is
sued." California groundwater is not regulated by a statewide manage-
5. City of Los Angeles v. City of San Fernando, 14 Cal. 3d 199, 278, 537 P.2d 1250, 1307, 123 Cal,
Rptr. 1, 58 (1975). A groundwater basin is considered to be in a state of surplus when the amount of water
extracted from it "is less than the maximum" amount of groundwater "that could be withdrawn without adverse
effects on the basin's long term supply." Id. at 277, 537 P.2d at 1307, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 58.
6. CALIFORNIA WATER: LOOKING TO THE FUTuRE, supra note 4, at 31.
7. Id. at 39-57..
8. For example, numerous state and federal laws must be satisfied prior to development of projects, such
as the National Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 4321-4370d (West 1977 & Supp. 1993), the state
Endangered Species Act, CAL. FISH & GAME CODE §§ 2050-2098 (West Supp. 1994), the federal Endangered
Species Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1543 (1988), the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C.A. §§ 1250-1376 (West 1986 &
Supp. 1993), and the California Environmental Quality Act, CAL. PuB. REs. CODE §§ 21000-21178.1 (West 1986
& Supp. 1994).
9. Donn W. Furman, Comment, Poisoned Waters: An Examination of Agricultural Water Pollution, 3
SAN JOAQUIN AGRIC. L. REv. 99, 100 (1993).
10. 4 CAL. WATER L. & POL'Y REP. 75, 80 (Feb. 1994).
11. See infra notes 21-72 (summarizing common law treatment of groundwater in California).
1022
1994 / Institutional Reforms in California Groundwater Law
ment system, despite the severe overdraft of many basins.12 The
California Legislature has not granted the State Water Resources Control
Board jurisdiction over groundwater, even though it may be interconnected
with surface water resources, because groundwater is presumed to be per-
colating water.13 Most property owners with land overlying groundwater
need only drill a well or construct other diversion works and extract the
groundwater. 4 Although some governmental controls do exist, they are
often not enforced with any consistency. This has led to judicial
management through court adjudications coupled with varying local
controls. This system has always been extremely inefficient and is now
hopelessly archaic. By way of examples, the adjudication of the San
Fernando Basin took twenty years to complete,"5 the adjudication of the
Raymond Basin took twelve years, 6 and the adjudication of the Mojave
Basin, after two different lawsuits and eighteen years, has still not been
completed.17
This Article considers possible institutional reforms in California
groundwater law that would better promote the protection of state
groundwater basins and natural resources, as well as ensure adequate water
supplies for consumptive uses. Part II discusses existing California
groundwater law. 8 Alternative methods of groundwater regulation that
have been implemented in other western states and the relative success of
each system are reviewed in Part 1I.1 9 Finally, Part IV contains an
outline of possible statewide reforms to protect the State's groundwater
and to ensure adequate supplies to meet the needs of all competing
uses.
20
12. The lack of state regulation of groundwater is in stark contrast to the elaborate regulation of
appropriated surface water. See CAL. VATER CODE §§ 1200-1851 (West 1971 & Supp. 1994) (describing the
regulation of appropriated surface water).
13. Percolating water is water that simply seeps through the ground and does not form any part of a
stream (subsurface or otherwise). Vineland Irrigation Dist. v. Azusa Irrigating Co., 126 Cal. 486, 494, 58 P.
1057, 1059 (1899).
14. The right to drill is limited only by the fact that all water must be used for a reasonable and beneficial
purpose. CAL. CONST. arL X, § 2.
15. City of Los Angeles v. City of San Fernando, 14 Cal. 3d 199, 207, 537 P.2d 1250, 1258-59, 123 Cal.
Rptr. 1, 9-10 (1975).
16. City of Pasadena v. City of Alhambra, 33 Cal. 2d 908, 916, 207 P.2d 17, 22-23 (1949).
17. Judgment Pursuant to Stipulation, City of Barstow v. City of Adelanto, No. 208568 (Riverside Sup.
Ct. May 4, 1993).
18. See infra notes 21-133 and accompanying text (describing current California groundwater law).
19. See infra notes 134-202 and accompanying text (discussing other states' groundwater regulations).
20. See infra notes 203-270 and accompanying text (explaining possible reforms to California
groundwater law).
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II. EXISTING GROUNDWATER LAW IN CALIFORNIA
A. Common Law
Unlike appropriated surface water, which is chiefly regulated by the
State Water Resources Control Board (SWRCB),21  groundwater in
California is primarily governed by common law doctrines and the State
Constitution, with disputes over groundwater frequently resolved through
the courts. The use of percolating groundwater in California is governed
by the doctrines of correlative rights, and reasonable and beneficial use.
The doctrine of reasonable use, which is set forth in Article X, section 2
of the California Constitution, 2 limits a groundwater user to the amount
of water reasonably needed for beneficial purposes.23 The doctrine of
correlative rights gives all landowners overlying a groundwater basin equal
rights to the water, and all must share in any water shortages.24 Rights
between overlying owners are mutual and reciprocal. Each overlying owner
is entitled to take all that can be beneficially used on the land if there is
enough water in the basin.' If there is not enough water in the basin,
however, then each user is limited to a proportionate fair share of the total
amount available based on reasonable need.26 Thus, in cases of water
shortage, all overlying owners are entitled to a fair and just proportion of
the available waters.27
An overlying use of groundwater can be paramount to a non-overlying
use. 2' A non-overlying use is considered an appropriative use when
groundwater is exported from an overlying area for use outside the
basin.29 The rationale for this rule is that the water used away from the
overlying property cannot return for further use, thus depleting the waters
21. See CAL. WATER CODE § 175 (West Supp. 1994) (establishing the State Water Resources Control
Board within the California Environmental Protection Agency). See generally id. §§ 1250-1845 (West 1971 &
Supp. 1994) (describing the duties of the State Water Resources Control Board within the context of surface
water appropriation).
22. See CAL. CONST. art. X, § 2 (stating that "[tihe right to water or to the use or flow of water in or
from any natural stream or water course in this State is and shall be limited to such water as shall be reasonably
required for the beneficial use to be served .... ").
23. Katz v. Walkinshaw, 141 Cal. 116, 134, 74 P. 766, 771 (1903).
24. Id. at 134-36, 74 P. at 771-72.
25. Tehachapi-Cummings County Water Dist. v. Armstrong, 49 Cal. App. 3d 992, 1001, 122 Cal. Rptr.
918, 924 (1975).
26. Id.
27. City of Pasadena v. City of Alhambra, 33 Cal. 2d 908, 925-26, 207 P.2d 17, 28 (1949).
28. Corona Foothill Lemon Co. v. Lillibridge, 8 Cal. 2d 522, 525, 66 P.2d 443, 444 (1937).
29. Armstrong, 49 Cal. App. 3d at 1000 n.6, 1001, 122 Cal. Rptr. at 924 n.6.
1024
1994 / Institutional Reforms in California Groundwater Law
underlying the lands of the overlying users and ultimately impairing their
value. Accordingly, water that is surplus to the reasonable and beneficial
needs of the overlying users is available to allow appropriation of
groundwater.30  To make matters more confusing, certain types of
underground water, underflow and underground streams, are appropriated
in the same manner as surface water, pursuant to the procedures in the
Water Code.31
In 1949, the California Supreme Court issued a landmark decision that
added a new principle to the long established correlative rights doctrine.32
In City of Pasadena v. City of Alhambra,33 most of the substantial
pumpers in the Raymond Basin, both overlying and appropriative, were
joined in a lawsuit to determine rights to the groundwater basin.'
Groundwater levels in the basin had been declining for twenty-two of the
twenty-four years prior to the filing of the lawsuit.35 The plaintiff, City
of Pasadena, claimed that extractions from the basin should be limited to
the safe yield of the basin.36
The court in Pasadena first decided that it would limit pumping to the
safe yield of the basin.37 The court then determined which of the parties
should bear the burden of curtailing the total production to the safe yield
by developing the doctrine of "mutual prescription. 38 The court held that
all parties who had appropriated water from the basin after the overdraft
began and before the complaint was filed acquired prescriptive rights
39
against all of the other overlying owners and prior appropriators. 40 In
doing this, the court rejected the notion that water must be allocated
30. These rules are modified with respect to groundwater storage rights; an importer of water to a basin
has first call to that amount of water that it adds to the total basin supply. See City of Los Angeles v. City of
San Fernando, 14 Cal. 3d 199, 255-64, 537 P.2d 1250, 1291-97, 123 Cal. Rptr. 1, 42-48 (1975) (summarizing
cases in which the importer of water to a basin was given first priority to the water that the importer added to
the total basin supply).
31. See CAL. WATER CODE § 1200 (West 1971) (providing the procedures for appropriating underflow
and underground streams).
32. See City of Pasadena v. City of Alhambra, 33 Cal. 2d 908, 926-28, 207 P.2d 17, 28-30 (1949)
(applying the doctrine of mutual prescription to appropriation of groundwater).
33. 33 Cal. 2d 908, 207 P.2d 17 (1949).
34. City of Alhambra, 33 Cal. 2d at 916, 207 P.2d at 22-23.
35. Id. at 922, 207 P.2d at 26.
36. Id. at 916, 207 P.2d at 22-23.
37. Id. at 924, 207 P.2d at 27.
38. Id. at 926-28, 207 P.2d at 28-30.
39. A prescriptive water right is a permanent right to use water acquired when the essential elements for
adverse use are present for the required period of time described by the applicable statute of limitations. HAROLD
E. ROGERS & ALAN H. NIcmois, WATER FOR CALIFORNIA §§ 228-229 (1967).
40. City of Pasadena v. City of Alhambra, 33 Cal. 2d 908, 933, 207 P.2d 17, 32-33 (1949).
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strictly on the basis of priority and first in time appropriation.4 The court
held that such strict application of the rule of priority would result in an
unequal sharing of the burden of curtailing water use because pumping by
later appropriators would be eliminated and no restriction on amount
would be placed on pumping by earlier appropriators.42 The parties
agreed to a stipulated judgment, which provided that their water rights
were based on the amount continuously used over the five years preceding
the litigation.43 Accordingly, the court limited pumping from the basin to
the basin's safe yield, with all parties' usage proportionately reduced.'
By reducing the amount that each party could extract, the Pasadena
court halted the decline of groundwater levels in the basin. A supply of
supplemental Colorado River water from the Metropolitan Water District
made the physical solution work, and the increased return flows resulting
from the use of larger amounts of imported water increased the safe yield
of the basin.4' As a result, in 1955 the court increased the amount the
parties could pump.46 Unfortunately, this concept of mutual prescription
also encourages greater groundwater pumping than necessary, creating "a
race to the pumphouse" mentality.47 In order to establish a right to the
groundwater, overlying well owners and landowners must extract
groundwater.4 8 There is no benefit from reducing pumping to conserve
water because the result would only be to make more water available to
others.
Groundwater rights in several Southern California water basins were
subsequently adjudicated. The West Basin,49 Central Basin"° and Main
San Gabriel Basin51 adjudications all were resolved with physical solu-
tions that depended on the availability of supplemental water. The
41. Id. at 932-33, 207 P.2d at 32.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 933, 207 P.2d at 33.
44. il at 922, 207 P.2d at 26.
45. James H. Krieger & Harvey 0. Banks, Ground Water Basin Management, 50 CAL. L. REV. 56,60-61
(1962).
46. IL at 61.
47. City of Los Angeles v. City of San Fernando, 14 Cal. 3d 199, 267, 537 P.2d 1250, 1299, 123 Cal.
Rptr. 1, 50 (1975).
48. See City of Pasadena v. City of Alhambra, 33 Cal. 3d 199, 926, 207 P.2d 17, 29 (1949) (stating that
the taking of nonsurplus groundwater must be actual, open and notorious for a prescriptive right to groundwater
to ripen).
49. See WILLIAM BLOMQUIST, DIVIDING THE WATERs: GOVERNING GROUNDWATER IN SOUTHERN
CALIFORNIA 97-126 (1992) (explaining the problems and solutions concerning the West Basin).
50. See id, at 127-58 (discussing the Central Basin).
51. See idL at 159-88 (reviewing issues concerning the Main San Gabriel Basin).
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judgments provide permanent watermaster 2  administration of
groundwater extractions under a judicially approved and supervised
physical solution that provides authority to fund and operate programs to
control groundwater overdrafts by replenishment with imported water. 3
In 1975, the California Supreme Court in City of Los Angeles v. City of
San Fernando,54 significantly curtailed the mutual prescription doctrine.
The court held that Civil Code section 100755 prevented prescription of
groundwater rights owned by public agencies and public utilities.56 This
case began in 1955 when the City of Los Angeles brought suit against the
cities of San Fernando, Glendale, Burbank and other pumpers to declare
that Los Angeles had a prior right to all of the groundwater in the upper
Los Angeles River Area.5 7 Los Angeles also sought to enjoin all other
pumpers from extracting groundwater without its permission.58
In a long decision touching on many kinds of water rights, the court
declined to rely upon the theory of mutual prescription5 9 The court held
that public agencies could not lose water rights through prescription, and
that prescription could not occur without actual notice of who is
prescripting the water.' The court concluded that an overlying user or
appropriator could neither claim a paramount right to the full quantity of
water that the user had been pumping, nor lose the right to pump by
reason of the continued pumping of others.61 All parties were subjected
to a proportionate reduction in the quantities of water they had been
pumping, as the court limited the total annual pumpage from the basin to
a safe yield.62
52. A watermaster serves as a managing agency and may perform various functions, including record-
collecting, accounting, policy-making, levying assessments, and purchasing and recharging areas with
supplemental water. See ANNE J. ScHNEIDER, GROUNDWATER RIGHTS IN CALIFORNIA, GOVERNOR'S
COMMISSION TO REVIEW CALIFORNIA WATER RIGH's 53-58 (1977) (describing watermaster management).
53. Ia at 22-25.
54. 14 Cal. 3d 199, 537 P.2d 1250, 123 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1975).
55. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1007 (West 1982) (indicating that one can never gain title to land dedicated
to a public use by a public utility or dedicated to or owned by the state or any public entity through
prescription).
56. City of Los Angeles v. City of San Fernando, 14 Cal. 3d 199, 274, 537 P.2d 1250, 1304-05, 123 Cal.
"Rptr. 1, 55-56 (1975).
57. Id. at 207-08, 537 P.2d at 1258-59, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 9-10.
58. Id. at 207, 537 P.2d at 1258-59, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 9-10.
59. Id. at 274, 537 P.2d at 1304-05, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 55-56.
60. Id at 277, 282, 537 P.2d at 1307, 1310, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 58, 61.
61. Id. at 283-86, 537 P.2d at 1311-13, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 62-64.
62. Id. at 293, 537 P.2d at 1319, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 69. The case also re-established that parties importing
water have a right to the return flow from it. Id. at 255-64, 537 P.2d at 1291-97, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 42-48.
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The major reason for the rejection of mutual prescription in the Los
Angeles case was that the fact situation was dramatically different than that
which occurred in Pasadena's Raymond Basin. In Los Angeles, none of the
defendants had begun using groundwater after the overdraft began.63 The
court frankly stated that mutual prescription was not needed for its purpose
in Pasadena-which was avoiding the complete elimination of later
appropriative uses.6
With the passage of nearly twenty years since the Los Angeles
decision, many practitioners have come to believe that the real law of the
case is contained in one footnote within the 161-page decision. 5 In
footnote 61, the court quoted extensively from a United States Supreme
Court case, Nebraska v. Wyoming,' which was decided on the basis of
equitable apportionment. The Los Angeles court stated that a mechanical
application of the mutual prescription doctrine did not always result in the
most equitable apportionment of water on the basis of need.67 The strong
implication of this statement was that, in the future, courts would have to
look at equitable factors, such as those considered in the Nebraska case,
including physical and climatic conditions, consumptive use in different
areas, and the extent of established uses.
68
As a result of the Los Angeles decision, significant uncertainty exists
over the status of the right to extract water from unadjudicated overdrafted
groundwater basins in California, at least to the extent the overdraft is
caused by entities extracting groundwater for public use.69 Unlike surface
water appropriators, there are no senior or junior water users that gain
priority by being the first to pump groundwater.70 Pumping simply
continues until it is determined that the basin is in overdraft.71 With no
statutory or regulatory scheme to allocate or protect the common supply,
an injured party's only remedy is to bring a lawsuit to stop harmful
63. Id. at 266, 537 P.2d at 1299, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 50.
64. Id. at 266-67, 537 P.2d at 1299, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 50.
65. See Los Angeles, 14 Cal. 3d at 265-66 n. 61, 537 P.2d at 1298 n. 61, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 49 n. 61.
66. 325 U.S. 589 (1945).
67. Los Angeles, 14 Cal. 3d at 265, 537 P.2d at 1298, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 49.
68. Id. An appellate court decision also noted that when insufficient groundwater is available, many
factors must be looked at in determining an owner's proportionate share. Tehachapi-Cummings County Water
Dist. v. Armstrong, 49 Cal. App. 3d 992, 1001, 122 Cal. Rptr. 918, 925 (1975). These factors include, but are
not limited to, the amount of water available, the extent of ownership in the basin, and the nature of the
projected use. Id. at 1001, 122 Cal. Rptr. at 925.
69. Wright v. Goleta Water Dist., 174 Cal. App. 3d 74, 90-91, 219 Cal. Rptr. 740, 751-52 (1985);
Armstrong, 49 Cal. App. 3d at 1000-02, 122 Cal. Rptr. at 923-25.
70. Armstrong, 49 Cal. App. 3d at 1001, 122 Cal. Rptr. at 924.
71. Id.
1028
1994 / Institutional Reforms in California Groundwater Law
pumping practices. Due to the expense and time involved in adjudicating
groundwater basin claims, as well as the uncertainty of results, only twelve
groundwater basin claims have been adjudicated in California, most of
which have been in Southern California.72
B. State Groundwater Control
Comprehensive legislation that would have adopted the
recommendations of the Commission to Review California Water Rights
Law created by Governor Edmund Brown73 was introduced in 1979 and
would have established groundwater provisions. The legislation
subsequently died in committee as a result of opposing ideas regarding
groundwater management.74 Despite the somewhat confused state of the
common law of groundwater regulation, the SWRCB's jurisdiction in this
area is extremely limited, particularly in comparison to its broad powers
to manage surface water.75 There are very few provisions in the Water
Code that can be utilized to control groundwater use. Water Code sections
4999 through 5008 require the reporting of all groundwater pumped in
Riverside, San Bernardino, Los Angeles and Ventura counties.76
However, this is an after-the-fact reporting requirement which consists
merely of the filing of a form, with no discretionary action by the SWRCB
to limit pumping or assess penalties for overdrafting basins.77
Other laws regarding groundwater are similarly unhelpful for those
seeking statewide control over groundwater. Water Code sections 1005.1
through 1008 protect groundwater pumpers from the loss of rights in
periods of non-use when they have alternative supplies available.78 Water
Code sections 13550 through 13554.3 prohibit the use of groundwater for
72. The adjudicated basins are as follows: Northern California - In Siskiyou County - Scott River
Stream System and Scott River Valley (as part of a general stream adjudication pursuant to Cal. Water Code
§§ 2500-2503 (1971)). Southern California - Kern County's Tehachapi Basin, the Cummings Basin of Kern
and San Bernardino Counties, Los Angeles County's Central Basin, West Basin, Upper Los Angeles River Area,
Raymond Basin, and Main San Gabriel Basin, San Bernardino County's Warren Valley Basin, Cucamonga
Basin, and San Bernardino Basin Area (partially in Riverside County), and the Chino Basin in Riverside County.
73. Cal. Exec. Order No. B-26-77 (May 11, 1977).
74. Michael P. Mallery, Comment, Groundwater: A Call for Comprehensive Management Program, 14
PAC. LJ. 1279, 1299 (1983).
75. See supra note 21 and accompanying text (discussing the SWRCB's extensive power to manage
surface water).
76. CAL. WATE CODE §§ 4999-5008 (West 1971 and Supp. 1994).
77. Id.
78. Id. §§ 1005.1-1008 (West 1971 & Supp. 1994).
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certain purposes such as golf course irrigation, if reclaimed water" is
readily available and reasonably priced.80 Section 1242 of the Water Code
requires that water stored in a groundwater basin be appropriated for that
purpose.81 Additionally, the Department of Water Resources has county
guidelines for well construction and abandonment ordinances.82
In contrast, the SWRCB's authority over surface water is far-reaching.
No surface water may be appropriated without an application to the State
Board. The SWRCB must issue a permit before surface water may be
appropriated, and a hearing may be required before the permit is issued. 4
The State Board is also specifically authorized to consider the
appropriation application in light of the protection of beneficial uses,
including fish and wildlife resources. 5 The California Supreme Court has
concluded that, except where vested rights will be negatively impacted, all
surface water appropriations should be subject to the Water Code
16provisions.
C. Local Government Management
Local public entities serve as the primary groundwater managers in
California today. Water users and local governments often prefer to create
a management structure for a groundwater basin by legislation, thus
assuring predictable groundwater extraction regulations and restricting its
place of use to the local area. Counties typically have groundwater well
permit requirements with their health and environmental protection
departments responsible for jurisdiction over domestic well supply and
quality issues.87 Water districts also have the ability to manage
groundwater.8
79. Reclaimed or recycled water is water that has been treated for waste and is, therefore, suitable for
beneficial use. Id § 13050(n) (West Supp. 1994).
80. Id §§ 13550-13554.3 (West 1992).
81. Id. § 1242 (West 1971).
82. Id. § 13800 (West 1992).
83. Id § 1250 (West 1971).
84. Id §§ 1225, 1250-1350 (West 1971 & Supp. 1994).
85. Id. § 1243 (West Supp. 1994); id. § 1243.5 (West 1971).
86. People v. Shirokow, 26 Cal. 3d 301, 309, 605 P.2d 859, 865, 162 Cal. Rptr. 30, 35 (1980).
87. For example, the County of San Bernardino has extensive well construction and operation
requirements. SAN BERNAIWINO CouNTY CODE 88 33.0630-33.0645 (Jan. 18, 1988) (copy on file with the
Pacific Law Journal).
88. For example, the Orange County Water District has been authorized by the legislature to manage
groundwater use and storage. CAL. WATER CODE app. §§ 40-1 to -45 (West 1968 & Supp. 1994).
1030
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Perhaps the earliest example of significant local control of groundwater
occurred in Orange County. Orange County began experiencing serious
groundwater overdraft in the 1920's, and in 1933 the Orange County
Water District was formed to deal with the problem.89 The Orange
County Water District Act was amended in 1953 to give the District
additional powers. 90 Foremost among these powers was the authority to
purchase and spread supplemental water and to implement pump and ad
valorem?' real property taxes.9 2 The purpose of the pump tax was to
raise funds needed to purchase a supplemental supply of water to replenish
the basin and to build in an incentive to conserve water by increasing its
cost.93 The ad valorem tax was to be used to offset the administrative
overhead in implementing the pump tax and to purchase replenishment
water in an amount up to 375,000 acre feet (the 1953 estimate of the
accumulated overdraft in the basin).94 The program has proved to be very
effective in reducing the critical overdraft in the basin.95
Unfortunately, effective local control over groundwater without
litigation, as occurred in Orange County, has been rare. In an attempt to
encourage more local control of groundwater, in 1992, the Legislature
adopted Assembly Bill 3030,96 which grants local entities the authority
to create groundwater management plans in groundwater basins.97 Enacted
as California Water Code sections 10750 through 10755.4, Assembly
Bill 3030 authorizes local agencies providing water service to adopt a
groundwater management plan subject to a hearing process and majority
protest by landowners.98 Any local agency, whose service area includes
a groundwater basin or portion of a groundwater basin that is not subject
to groundwater management pursuant to another judgment or statute, may
adopt or implement a groundwater management plan.99 Additionally, a
local agency that does not provide water service, but provides flood
89. Blomquist, supra note 49, at 247-49.
90. Id. at 254.
91. An ad valorem tax is a tax imposed on the value of property. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 51 (6th ed.
1990).
92. Krieger & Banks, supra note 45, at 62.
93. Id.
94. Blomquist, supra note 49, at 253-54.
95. Id. at 269; Krieger & Banks, supra note 45, at 62.
96. 1992 Cal. Stat. ch. 947, § 2, at 3897-3901 (enacting CAL. WATER CODE §§ 10750-10767).
97. CAL WATER CODE § 10753(a) (West Supp. 1994).
98. Id. §§ 10753.2-10753.9 (West Supp. 1994).
99. Id. § 10753(a) (West Supp. 1994).
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control, groundwater quality management or groundwater replenishment
may also implement a water management plan.'00
A groundwater management plan may include components relating to
the control of saline water intrusion, regulation of the migration of conta-
minated groundwater, mitigation of conditions of overdraft and the replen-
ishment of groundwater extracted by water producers."0' However, the
statute does not authorize the local agency to make a binding
determination of the water rights of any person or entity. 02 Additionally,
the statute does not authorize the local agency to limit or suspend
extractions unless it has determined that groundwater replenishment
programs or other alternative sources of water supply have proved insuffi-
cient or infeasible to lessen the demand for groundwater.10 3
Although Assembly Bill 3030 was only recently adopted, one court has
already- indicated that it will be taken seriously as a method for local
groundwater control.1°4 In Myers Seed v. County of Tehama,10 5 the
superior court invalidated a Tehama County ordinance designed to protect
groundwater resources of the county.1°6 The ordinance prohibited the
operation of new wells that impacted neighboring wells and prohibited
transport of pumped water off the parcel on which the well was located
without a permit issued by the county.0 7 The court invalidated the
ordinance because the county had failed to comply with the requirement
of Water Code section 10750, which requires local agencies to work
cooperatively to manage groundwater within their jurisdiction.' The
court found that Tehama County's failure to consult with other agencies
100. Id. § 10753(b) (West Supp. 1994).
101. Id. § 10753.7 (West Supp. 1994).
102. Id. § 10753.8(b) (West Supp. 1994).
103. Id. § 10753.8(c) (West Supp. 1994). Assembly Bill 1152 prohibits the local agency from imposing
Assembly Bill 3030 fees or assessments on pumping of groundwater pursuant to a groundwater remediation
program required by law or a groundwater storage contract with a local agency. 1993 Cal. Legis. Serv. ch. 320,
sec. 4 (amending CAL. WATER CODE § 10754.2).
104. Statement of Decision, Myers v. County of Tehama, Nos. 34147,34446 (Tehama Sup. CL Aug. 11,
1993).
105. Id. Tehama County appealed to the California Court of Appeal, Third District. County Authority to
Regulate Groundwater to Be Decided by Court of Appeal, 4 CAL. WATER L. & POL'Y REP. 75, 90 (Feb. 1994).
The case will be the first direct appellate consideration of the preemption issue. Id.
106. Statement of Decision at 4, Myers v. County of Tehama, Nos. 34147, 34446 (Tehama Sup. Ct. Aug.
11, 1993).
107. Tehama Court Invalidates Groundwater Ordinance, 4 CAL. WATER L. & POL'Y REp. 1, 11 (Oct.
1993).
108. Statement of Decision at 4, Myers v. County of Tehama, Nos. 34147, 34446 (Tehama Sup. Ct. Aug.
11, 1993).
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invalidated the ordinance. 9 It remains to be seen if the provisions of
Assembly Bill 3030 will lead to more effective local control of
groundwater, although district management has the advantage of taking
public interest, as well as private rights, into account, and there is enough
flexibility to deal with changes in circumstances.
Another type of local control of groundwater is exercised through
Water Replenishment Districts, which are special districts formed to
replenish groundwater supplies within district boundaries.110 The purpose
of these districts is to take any actions necessary: (1) to replenish the
groundwater of the district, including buying, selling and exchanging
water; (2) to protect or prevent interference with water, the quality or the
water rights of any person or property within the district; or (3) to put
water to beneficial use that is under its control or management."1 A
district may also take action to prevent contaminants from entering its
groundwater supplies and to remove contaminants from its groundwater
supplies."' A district also has the power to take any actions outside the
district to protect groundwater supplies within the district, provided there
is a direct relationship between the groundwater supply where the action
is to be taken and the groundwater supply within the district.'
Additionally, several groundwater management districts, primarily
located in Northern California, have been formed by the State
Legislature.114 Several of these districts regulate groundwater extraction
by ordinance or impose pump taxes on extractions. For example, the Fox
Canyon Groundwater Management Agency Act allows the adoption of
ordinances to control the use and extraction of groundwater and levies
groundwater extraction charges. 5
109. Id.
110. See CAL. WATER CODE §§ 60000-60449 (West 1966 & Supp. 1994) (establishing the Water
Replenishment District Act).
111. Id. §§ 60220-60223 (West 1966).
112. Id. § 60224 (West 1966 & Supp. 1994).
113. Id. § 60225 (West 1966 & Supp. 1994).
114. Examples of groundwater management districts include the following: Honey Lake Valley Ground
Water Management District, Lassen County, CAL. WATER CODE app. §§ 129-101 to 129-1301 (West Supp.
1994), Sierra Valley Ground Water Management District, Sierra County, Id §§ 119-101 to 119-1302 (West
Supp. 1994), Mono County Ti-Valley Ground Water Management District, Mono County, Id. §§ 128-1 to 128-
906 (West Supp. 1994), Mendocino City Community Services District, Mendocino County, CAL. WATER CODE
§§ 10700 to 10717 (West 1992), Pajaro Valley Water Management Agency, Santa Cruz County, CAL. WATER
CODE app. § 124-1 to 124-1108 (West Supp. 1994), Ojai Ground Water Management Agency, Ventura County,
l §§ 131-101 to 131-1107 (West Supp. 1994), Fox Canyon Ground Water Management Agency, Ventura
County, Ua. §§ 121-102 to 121-1105 (West Supp. 1994), Monterey Peninsula Water Management District,
Monterey County, Id. §§ 118-101 to 118-901 (West Supp. 1994).
115. CAL WATER CODE app. §§ 121-403 to 121-1001 (West Supp. 1994).
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Counties also control groundwater through ordinances enacted in
response to local problems. Long before enactment of the Tehama County
ordinance discussed above, Inyo County adopted an ordinance regulating
the extraction of groundwater within the Owens Valley." 6 This
ordinance, adopted in 1980 in response to groundwater exports by the City
of Los Angeles, established a comprehensive system of groundwater
management," 7 with the goal of protecting Inyo County's environment
and economy. Environmental damage can be mitigated under the ordinance
by maintaining the groundwater level at a depth which is capable of
supporting natural resources." 8 The ordinance also attempts to satisfy the
needs of extractors by considering alternative sources of supply and their
conservation policies and practices." 9 The City of Los Angeles
challenged the ordinance in court, but the parties reached a settlement
before a decision was entered. 20
At least three other counties have enacted groundwater control
ordinances. Imperial County enacted an ordinance designed to prevent the
exportation of groundwater to Mexico, and Butte and Glen Counties
enacted virtually identical ordinances to prevent the exportation of
groundwater from their respective counties.' 1 At least one commentator
has questioned the constitutionality of these ordinances. 2 2 The enactment
of Assembly Bill 3030 and the Tehama County decision may cast a further
shadow over their validity.'2
A potential problem with these ordinances is that counties and other
local entities may not have the ability to regulate groundwater within their
police powers. In Birkenfield v. City of Berkeley,24 the California
116. INO COUNTY, CAL., CODE ch. 7.01 (1980).
117. Antonio Rossman & Michael J. Steel, Forging the New Water Law; Public Regulation of
"Proprietary" Groundwater Rights, 33 HAST. LJ. 903, 930 (1982); see id at 929-49 (discussing the Inyo
County ordinance).
118. Id at 930-31.
119. Id.
120. Russell Kletzing, Imported Groundwater Banking: The Kern Water Bank - A Case Study, 19 PAC.
LJ. 1225, 1262 (1988).
121. d at 1261-62.
122. Id at 1262.
123. l The constitutionality of these ordinances has been challenged as conflicting with the constitutional
requirement that water be put to reasonable use to the maximum extent possible. Id.; see CAL. CONST. art. X,
§ 2 (requiring the state's water resources to be put to the most beneficial use).
124. 17 Cal. 3d 129, 550 P.2d 1001, 130 Cal. Rptr. 465 (1976).
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Supreme Court stated that a city's police power can be applied only within
its own territory and can be preempted by general state law."z
Additionally, local entities are subordinate to state laws that regulate
groundwater.12 6 For example, a county's police power is considered
preempted if it is in conflict with general laws.' 27 Thus, local ordinances
could be invalid if either expressly or impliedly in conflict with state law.
On the other hand, in 1933, the California Supreme Court upheld a county
ordinance preventing groundwater extractions for a wasteful, unreasonable
or non-beneficial purpose. 128 The Court found that the ordinance was a
valid exercise of the county's police power and that groundwater was not
solely the responsibility of the State Legislature.1 29 In a more recent case,
a court of appeal upheld a county water district's underground water
storage program. 3 ' In Niles Sand & Gravel Company v. Alameda Water
District,131 a gravel company was enjoined from interfering with the
District's storage program through its pumping operations. 1 2 The court
held that any damage caused by the District's program to the gravel
operator was noncompensable 3 3
Most western states employ some type of statewide system of
groundwater regulation. These schemes encompass a wide spectrum of
possible systems, with some states opting for a heavily centralized regime,
while others rely more on local control. Each state must develop a system
tailored to its particular needs and political situation. As one of the final
holdouts in the area of groundwater management, California has the
advantage of being able to evaluate the successes and failures of other
states' programs before it decides on the regime which best fits California.
125. Birkenfield v. City of Berkeley, 17 Cal. 3d 129, 140, 550 P.2d 1001, 1009, 130 Cal. Rptr. 465, 473
(1976).
126. CAt. CONST. art X, § 7.
127. l; see Rossman & Steel, supra note 117, at 936-43 (discussing preemption of local groundwater
regulations).
128. In re Maas, 219 Cal. 422, 426-27, 27 P.2d 373, 374-75 (1933).
129. Id. at 424-25, 27 P.2d at 374.
130. Niles Sand & Gravel Co. v. Alameda Water Dist., 37 Cal. App. 3d 924, 112 Cal. Rptr. 846 (1974).
131. 37 Cal. App. 3d 924, 112 Cal. Rptr. 846 (1974).
132. Xd at 927, 112 Cal. Rptr. at 848.
133. Id. at 936-37, 112 Cal. Rptr. at 854-55.
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III. GROUNDWATER REGULATIONS IN OTHER STATES
A. Texas
The system used to regulate groundwater in Texas is very similar to
that used in California, in that Texas has no centralized mechanism of state
regulation." Texas groundwater belongs to the owner of the overlying
estate.135 The system is based on the English Rule of absolute ownership
of groundwater, which Texas has followed since 1904.136 The English
Rule is a rule of capture or first possession, based on the concept that
groundwater is not owned until it is pumped or "captured.' 37 In Corpus
Christi v. Pleasanton,138 the Texas Supreme Court applied the English
Rule and held that percolating waters are the property of the owner of the
surface estate. 139 Therefore, an overlying landowner can use all of the
percolating water that the owner can capture for beneficial purposes, on or
off the owner's land." The overlying owner can also sell such water to
others, who may put the water to beneficial use on or off the original
owner's property.' I
The Texas Legislature has not chosen to exercise control over
groundwater. The statute that describes the waters of the State does not
even mention percolating waters. 4 2 By failing to modify the common
law rule of absolute ownership, the Texas Legislature has abdicated any
authority it may have had to regulate groundwater directly. 3 In addition,
the legislature surrendered any ability it had to manage groundwater by
134. Karen H. Norris, The Stagnation of Texas Ground Water Law: A Political v. Environmental
Stalemate, 22 ST. MARY'S L. REv. 493, 508-09 (1990).
135. TEX. WATER CODE ANN. § 52.002 (West Supp. 1994).
136. Norris, supra note 134, at 498 n.32 (citing Houston & T.C. Ry. v. East, 81 S.W. 279, 280 (Tex.
1904)). The Texas Supreme Court reaffirmed the holding in Houston as recently as 1983. City of Sherman v.
Public Utilities Commission, 643 S.W.2d 681, 686 (Tex. 1983).
137. David Todd, Common Resources, Private Rights and Liabilities: A Case Study on Texas Groundwater
Law, 32 NAT. REsOURCEs .. 233, 249 (1992).
138. 276 S.W.2d 798 (Tex. 1955).
139. Corpus Christi v. Pleasanton, 276 S.W.2d 798, 802 (Tex. 1955.)
140. Id.
141. Id. The user may even transport the water for use outside of the entire basin's surface area. Id.
142. See TEX. WATER CODE ANN. § 11.021(a) (West 1988) (describing the water that is the property of
the state).
143. Eric Behrens & Matthew G. Dore, Rights of Landowners to Percolating Groundwater in Texas, 32
S. TEx. LJ. 185, 192 (1991). Section 52.002 of the Texas Water Code states, in relevant part: "[t]he ownership
and rights of the owner of the land and his lessees and assigns in underground water are hereby recognized, and
nothing in this code shall be construed as depriving or divesting the owner or his lessees and assigns of the
ownership or rights." TEX. WATER CODE ANN § 52.002 (West Supp. 1994).
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exempting such water from regulations common to surface water.1" The
legislature's primary attempts to regulate groundwater have consisted of
the passage of a conservation amendment and a law requiring the plugging
and capping of flowing artesian wells. 45
Instead of directly regulating groundwater, the Texas Legislature has
simply codified judicial decisions. 46 The courts, however, have not wel-
comed this deference. 47 They have resisted involvement in groundwater
disputes, claiming that groundwater regulation is primarily a legislative
problem.148 Matters have been made worse by defining "groundwater"
broadly, thereby expanding the amount of unregulated water in the State.
As in California, Texas has the presumption that groundwater is per-
colating water. 14
9
Texas has placed the chief political responsibility for regulating
groundwater withdrawals on local entities known as Underground Water
Conservation Districts. 5 ' Such districts have the authority to control well
spacing, recharge aquifers, monitor activities, pursue research and
education, and reduce wasteful uses.' Their local nature makes them
better suited than state agencies for certain tasks, such as designing
conservation plans ideally tailored for the needs of specific areas.
52
However, there are many documented shortcomings of the districts, most
of which are related to their lack of state-wide funding and enforcement
authority. 153
This laissez-faire attitude toward groundwater use in Texas has not
served the State well.'54 Not surprisingly, the problems Texas faces with
144. TEX. WATER CODE ANN. § 52.003 (West Supp. 1994).
145. TEx. CONST. art. XVI, § 59; see TEX. WATER CODE ANN. §§ 11.201-11.207 (West 1988 & Supp.
1994) (governing artesian wells).
146. Todd, supra note 137, at 258.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Norris, supra note 134, at 501-02. The Texas Water Code limits the definition of "underground
water" to percolating water, thereby excluding water flowing underground. TEX. WATER CODE ANN. § 52.001(b)
(West Supp. 1994). However, the courts apply the presumption that water underneath one's property is
percolating. Texas Co. v. Burkett, 296 S.W. 273, 278 (Tex. 1927).
150. See TEX. WATER CODE ANN. §§ 52.001-52.401 (West 1972 & Supp. 1994) (governing underground
water districts).
151. Id. § 52.117 (West 1988); id. § 52.169 (West Supp. 1990).
152. Norris, supra note 134, at 500-01 n.44.
153. Id. at 503; see also Todd, supra note 137, at 259-60 (describing the problems with Underground
Water Conservation Districts).
154. See, e.g., Norris, supra note 134, at 504-05 (stating that groundwater supply problems will worsen
if the state does not take action); Todd, supra note 137, at 262 (explaining that there are serious problems with
groundwater use in Texas).
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its groundwater supply are the same, if not worse, than the problems in
California. Water authorities in Texas complain that water supplies during
a drought will barely meet demand.155 Many of the state's aquifers are
losing water faster than they can naturally recharge. 5 6 Much of the
groundwater is contaminated by abandoned wells.5 7 Finally, the runaway
pumping of groundwater has caused Texas to run afoul of the Endangered




If the regulatory schemes of Texas and California illustrate the sporadic
and inefficient approach to groundwater management, New Mexico's
method of regulation sits at the opposite end of the regulatory spectrum.
For over a century, New Mexico has followed the rule of prior
appropriation,'59 which is based on the "first come, first served"
principle.' 6 In other words, the first beneficial user of groundwater
retains the right to use.' 61 Importantly, New Mexico law also provides
that all groundwater in the state belongs to the public. 62 Therefore,
although anyone has the right to beneficially use groundwater, and
"priority of appropriation [gives] the better right,' ' 163 one must follow the
procedures set out by state law to obtain a permit to withdraw
groundwater 64
The permitting system employed by New Mexico is very centralized
and relatively simple. Any person who wants to appropriate groundwater
from a declared water basin must apply for a permit from the State
Engineer.' 65 The State Engineer acts like a "water czar," administering
155. Norris, supra note 134, at 504.
156. Id. at 505.
157. Id. at 503.
158. See infra notes 243-250 (explaining that a federal judge held that the excessive pumping of the
Edwards Aquifer was violating the Endangered Species Act).
159. N.M. CONST. art. 16, § 2; Trambley v. Luterman, 27 P. 312, 315 (N.M. 1891).
160. Norris, supra note 134, at 508.
161. Id.
162. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 72-12-1 (Michie 1985).
163. N.M. CONST. art. 16, § 2.
164. See N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 72-12-1 to 72-12-28 (Michie 1985 & Supp. 1993) (governing underground
waters).
165. See id. § 72-12-3 (Michie 1985) (limiting the State Engineer's power to declare an underground
basin). The application must include: (1) The particular underground stream, channel, artesian basin, reservoir,
or lake from which water will be appropriated; (2) the beneficial use to which the water will be applied; (3) the
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all matters relating to the appropriation, transfer and distribution of all
water within the state." However, the State Engineer does not have
jurisdiction where there is no declared basin.167 The State Engineer also
has no control over water rights acquired prior to the creation of the
Engineer's power, but such rights become subject to the State Engineer's
jurisdiction if they are transferred. 168
The State Engineer may approve an application and issue a permit to
appropriate groundwater from a declared basin only after a determination
that unappropriated water is available and that the proposed appropriation
will not adversely affect existing appropriators. 69 The applicant has the
burden of proof on these issues, but the State Engineer must also make an
independent investigation. 170 New Mexico law also allows the State
Engineer to revoke an appropriation permit when an owner fails to
beneficially use water for four years and continues not to use the water for
a year after the State Engineer notifies the owner of the potential
forfeiture.' However, the courts are reluctant to uphold such forfeitures
and look hard to find an acceptable reason for the nonuse.'7
2
Judicial decisions in New Mexico have reinforced the State Engineer's
broad administrative powers over groundwater. For example, the courts
have held that the State Engineer has the power to allow water to be taken
from an underground water basin only until a certain predetermined point
and then terminate all existing water rights at one time.17 3 In addition,
location of the proposed well; (4) the name of the owner of the land on which the well will be located; (5) the
amount of water applied for;, (6) the use for which the water is desired; and (7) if the use is for irrigation, the
description of the land to be irrigated and the name of the owner of the land. Id.
166. Id. § 72-2-1 (Michie 1985).
167. Id. § 72-12-25 (Michie 1985). The State Engineer may not declare a basin if an aquifer is 2,500 feet
or more below the ground surface and contains nonpotable water. Id. All declared basins must have ascertainable
boundaries. Id. By 1984, the State Engineer had declared 31 basins, covering over 84,000 square miles. Zachary
A. Smith, Centralized Decisionmaking in the Administration ofGroundwater Rights: The Experience ofArizona,
California and New Mexico and Suggestions for the Future, 24 NAT. RESOURCES J. 641, 677 (1984).
168. Charles T. DuMars, New Mexico Water Law: An Overview and Discussion of Current Issues, 22 NAT.
RE OURCES J. 1045, 1047 (1982). The State Engineer also has no discretion over wells for nominal domestic
use. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 72-12-1 (Michie 1985). The State Engineer must grant the permit upon receipt of an
application for the permit. Id.
169. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 72-12-3(E) (Michie 1985).
170. See DuMars, supra note 168, at 1048-52 (citing City of Roswell v. Berry, 452 P.2d 179 (N.M.
1969)); Smith, supra note 163, at 677-78 (citing McBee v. Reynolds, 399 P.2d 110 (N.M. 1965) and Heine v.
Reynolds, 367 P.2d 708 (N.M. 1962)).
171. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 72-12-8(A) (Michie Supp. 1993).
172. DuMars, supra note 168, at 1052.
173. See Mathers v. Texaco, Inc., 421 P.2d 771, 776 (N.M. 1966) (explaining that the State Engineer has
the authority to permit water to be taken from an underground water basin until a predetermined point and then
terminate all existing water rights at one time); see also DuMars, supra note 168, at 1054-56 (providing a
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the State Engineer can regulate the relationship between groundwater
withdrawals and surface water appropriations by forcing new well users to
retire surface rights to match the additional well's reduction of surface
flow.
17 4
A mid-1980's poll indicated that the various players in the New
Mexico groundwater arena were pleased with the State's centralized
system.175 They cited "uniformity and consistency" as benefits of the
scheme, and they felt that a more localized regime would add needless
costs and procedures. 176 However, this is not to say that the "water czar"
system works perfectly, even within New Mexico itself. The poll indicated
that the users' opinion of the centralized system was highly dependent on
the identity and attitudes of the State Engineer. 77 The obvious
implication is that New Mexico groundwater users will remain happy with
the centralized regime only if it continues to serve their interests. 178 In
fact, the power of the State Engineer has not enabled New Mexico to
avoid the problem of overdraft: in 1970, for example, statewide overdraft
was estimated at 719,000 acre-feet. 179
C. Arizona
Arizona's experience with groundwater management falls somewhere
between those of New Mexico and Texas. While surface water and water
flowing in underground channels in Arizona are public property subject to
the prior appropriation doctrine, 80 percolating waters are governed by
the rule of reasonable use.' Under this rule, which is also called the
American rule, people may use the groundwater located beneath their land,
but they are limited to the amount of water "reasonably necessary for the
lengthy discussion of Mathers).
174. See City of Albuquerque v. Reynolds, 379 P.2d 73, 81-82 (N.M. 1962) (providing that tile State
Engineer can require new well users to retire surface rights to match the additional well's reduction of surface
flow); see also DuMars, supra note 168, at 1056-57 (providing a lengthy discussion of Reynolds).
175. Smith, supra note 167, at 686.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Id. at 686-87.
179. Id. at 643 n.11.
180. ARz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 45-141(A) (Supp. 1993).
181. Smith, supra note 163, at 644. Arizona courts presume that groundwater is percolating (i.e., not part
of an identifiable stream). Maricopa County Mun. Water Conservation Dist. v. Southwest Cotton Co., 4 P.2d
369, 374 (Ariz. 1931).
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beneficial use of the surface estate."'"2 The doctrine prohibits owners
from transferring the water to another or to outside land.'83
This original scheme failed to manage groundwater efficiently, and as
early as the 1930's, the Arizona Legislature began searching for a more
controlled system of management.' After several unsuccessful
attempts,' the legislature passed the 1980 Groundwater Management
Act ("Act"), 86 a restrictive and detailed plan for groundwater regulation.
The core of the Act was the creation of four Active Management Areas
(AMA),' 87 encompassing over eighty percent of Arizona's population and
sixty-nine percent of its overdraft.'88 The Act also created the State
Department of Water Resources (DWR) and provided the agency with
jurisdiction over all ground and surface water within the state. 8 9
The Act sets certain goals for each AMA' 90 and directs the DWR to
attain those goals by issuing detailed management plans for each
AMA.191 The Act requires plans for five different management
periods, 92 with stricter conservation measures being phased in with each
successive plan.' 93 Persons within an AMA may withdraw groundwater
only if they have a DWR permit or possess a "grandfather right."'194 The
Act lists the seven types of withdrawal permits that the DWR may
182. Norris, supra note 134, at 507-08.
183. Id. at 508.
184. Smith, supra note 167, at 645.
185. See id. at 645-49 (describing efforts to enact groundwater regulations).
186. ARmZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 45-401 to 45-655 (1987 & Supp. 1993) [hereinafter "the Act"]. The
Arizona Supreme Court has affirmed the Act's constitutionality. Town of Chino Valley v. City of Prescott, 638
P.2d 1324, 1330 (Ariz. 1981). For a detailed summary of the Act and its passage, see Philip R. Higdon &
Terence W. Thompson, The 1980 Arizona Groundwater Management Code, 1980 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 621 (1980)
(discussing the 1980 Arizona Groundwater Management Code).
187. ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 45-411 (1987).
188. Smith, supra note 167, at 651.
189. Aiuz. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 45-102 to 45-103 (1987 & Supp. 1993). The governor appoints the
director of the DWR with the advice and consent of the Senate. Id. § 45-104 (Supp. 1993).
190. Id. § 45-562 (1987).
191. Id. §§ 45-564 to 45-568 (Supp. 1993).
192. Id. The five management periods are: 1980-1990, 1990-2000,2000-2010,2010-2020 and 2020-2025.
Id.
193. Smith, supra note 167, at 653. If the conservation plans have proved to be unsuccessful by the year
2006, the Act allows the DWR to purchase and retire water rights for irrigated land. AI. REV. STAT. ANN. §
45-566(A)(9) (1993).
194. Smith, supra note 163, at 654.
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issue.195 There are three types of grandfather rights,19 any of which
must be claimed within fifteen months of the naming of an AMA."9
Even if a person possesses an irrigation grandfather right to extract
groundwater from an AMA, the Act limits the amount available to that
which the AMA director determines is necessary to irrigate the land. 198
The Act provides some flexibility by allowing such owners to "bank"
allowable water not withdrawn in a given year and, conversely, to exceed
their limits and make up the difference later. 99 The Act anticipates that
over time the AMA directors will manipulate the allowable levels in a
downward direction, in order to implement the conservation goals of the
Act.200 Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the Act includes civil and
criminal sanctions for violators.2 1
The Arizona Groundwater Management Act is one of the newest and
most comprehensive regulatory regimes for groundwater in the West. 2
The system has a psychological advantage over New Mexico's prior
appropriation scheme in that property owners still technically own the
water beneath their property pursuant to the reasonable use doctrine. 3
One would also expect the Act to provide economic benefits by employing
a statewide authority, as one large public entity tends to be more efficient
than numerous small agencies.204 On the other hand, some have already
identified perceived problems with the Act, such as shortcomings in the
195. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 45-513 to 45-519 (1987 & Supp. 1993); see Smith, supra note 167, at
657-59 (describing each type of permit).
196. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 45-462(D) (1987). The first such right is the "irrigation grandfather right,"
which arises on land that was irrigated at some point during the five years prior to the creation of the AMA.
Id. § 45-465 (Supp. 1993). The second such right is the "type I non-irrigation right," which is created when a
person buys and retires an irrigation grandfather right. Id. § 45-463 (Supp. 1993). Finally, there is the "type II
non-irrigation right," created by withdrawals made for non-irrigation purposes during any one of the five years
prior to the creation of an AMA. Id. § 45-464 (1987).
197. Id. § 45-476(A) (Supp. 1993).
198. Id. § 45-465 (Supp. 1993).
199. Id. § 45-467 (Supp. 1993); see Smith, supra note 163, at 655-56 (providing a more detailed
explanation of the system).
200. Smith, supra note 167, at 656.
201. AIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 45-635 to 45-636 (1987). As for judicial review of director decisions, the
Act allows aggrieved parties to appeal to a special judge appointed by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court.
Id. § 45-405(F) (1987).
202. Smith, supra note 167, at 660.
203. Norris, supra note 134, at 515. The adoption of a prior appropriation scheme by a state today would
also be more difficult to justify under its police powers than reasonable use would be. Id. at 515-16.
204. Id. at 516.
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program's conservation measures.2 5 In fact, it is probably too early to
determine if the Act simply needs fine-tuning, or if a successful program
of detailed statewide regulation of groundwater is impossible to achieve in
Arizona. 206
IV. THE FUTURE DIRECrION OF GROUNDWATER
LAW IN CALIFORNIA
California groundwater is not currently regulated by a statewide
management system. 7 The resulting management void has contributed
to the severe overdraft of many basins. 8 Given the competing demands
placed on groundwater within the state and the inability of the courts to
provide encompassing protective measures, it appears that California must
institutionally reform its system of groundwater management or face
potentially disastrous consequences in the not-so-distant future.
A. Adjudications
In the absence of any comprehensive groundwater legislation, the
future of groundwater law will be its past, and the regulation of
groundwater through court adjudications will continue. In twelve
groundwater basins in California, disputes over the right to use
groundwater have been settled by the courts.2M Courts can use the
reference adjudication procedure, which is applicable to all water rights
and allows a court to refer matters to the State Board as a referee on any
or all matters involved with a lawsuit for a determination of rights to
water.210 However, as a practical matter, the State Board is so busy with
other issues that this is probably not a feasible procedure unless a court
wants to postpone a matter for five years. Even after a reference is
completed, a trial can be conducted on exceptions taken to the reference
205. See Robert Jerome Glennon, "Because That's Where the Water Is": Retiring Current Water Uses to
Achieve the Safe-Yield Objective of the Arizona Groundwater Management Act, 33 ARIZ. L. REV. 89, 95-98
(1991) (identifying the weaknesses inherent in the conservation program).
206. See Smith, supra note 167, at 685 (noting that users in Arizona felt that it was too soon to predict
the effectiveness of the Act).
207. See supra notes 73-86 and accompanying text (discussing the history of water use in California).
208. See supra notes 1-8 and accompanying text (describing the extent of overdraft in California).
209. See supra note 72 and accompanying text (stating that claims involving twelve groundwater basins
have been adjudicated in California).
210. See CAL. WATER CODE §§ 2000-2076 (West 1971 & Supp. 1994) (governing the determination of
water rights with the State Board as referee).
1043
Pacific Law Journal / Vol. 25
report.2 ' The losing party can except to everything in the report,
requiring the trial court to conduct a de novo review. Such a result
essentially eliminates the usefulness of the reference.
Adjudications have other shortcomings. Because a statutory adjudica-
tion cannot include a determination of percolating groundwater rights, it
is ultimately not a useful tool for judicial groundwater management.212
Adjudications are also always very lengthy and expensive, as attempting
to serve all of the parties in a large basin can take years, with no certainty
of outcome. Additionally, adjudications do not regulate water quality. For
example, the main San Gabriel Basin Water Master had to return to court
to be able to limit pumping for quality reasons. 3
Finally, the public interest is often not represented, since adjudications
involve privately-held rights. Future uncertainty can also be a problem,
since adjudications are not controlling on non-parties or non-using
overlying owners. A court has also held that an unused overlying water
right may not be subordinated to presently exercised appropriative
rights. 4 In reaching this conclusion, the court decried the legislature's
inaction in the groundwater arena.21 5 In Wright v. Goleta Water
District,21 6  the court addressed the issues of whether it should
subordinate an unexercised overlying right to an exercised appropriative
right. 7 The court carefully considered the decision in In Re Waters of
Long Valley Stream System,218 a case involving a statutory adjudication
where the court held that the State Board had the power to subordinate the
right of an unexercised riparian user to all currently exercised rights.2 1 9
The Long Valley court recognized that the effects of future uncertainty
concerning water use inhibit long-range planning and foster litigation.220
The court in Wright stated that such concerns should apply with "equal
vigor" to groundwater since the legislature had totally failed to enact a
211. Id. § 2017 (West 1971).
212. See id. § 2501 (West 1971) (providing that the Board may determine the rights of a stream system);
see also idL § 2500 (West 1971) (excluding underground water, other than subterranean streams through known
channels, from the definition of a stream system).
213. See Blomquist, supra note 49, at 175-76 (explaining that the San Gabriel Basin Water Master had
to receive court permission to limit pumping for quality reasons).
214. Wright v. Goleta Water Dist., 174 Cal. App. 3d 74, 87, 219 Cal. Rptr. 740, 749 (2d Dist. 1985).
215. l at 87-88, 219 Cal. Rptr. at 749-50.
216. 174 Cal. App. 3d 74,219 Cal. Rptr. 740 (2d Dist. 1985).
217. Id at 78, 219 Cal. Rptr. at 743.
218. 25 Cal. 3d 339, 599 P.2d 656, 158 Cal. Rptr. 350 (1979).
219. In re Waters of Long Valley Stream Sys., 25 Cal. 3d 339, 358-59, 599 P.2d 656, 668,158 Cal. Rptr.
350, 362 (1979).
220. Id. at 355, 599 P.2d at 666, 158 Cal. Rptr. at 360.
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program to fulfill the State's water policy declarations."1 In a stinging
rebuke to existing water policy, the court concluded:
Even though it may appear a logical extension of Long
Valley to allow a trial court adjudicating competing claims
to groundwater to subordinate an unexercised right to a present
appropriate use, we must hold such extension inappropriate.
Philosophically, we agree with the District's position but stare
decisis and due process considerations, not a concern under the
current riparian scheme, compel us to reach the opposite conclusion
in this case.222
Although no legislative action has been taken since these decisions, an
example of the future of groundwater adjudications is found in the
adjudication initiated by the Mojave Water Agency over the waters of the
Mojave River watershed in the Mojave desert in southern California.
Although this adjudication encompassed both surface and groundwater, its
provisions are likely to be emulated in any future groundwater
adjudications.
The lawsuit was initiated in 1990 by the City of Barstow which alleged
that the cumulative water production upstream of Barstow had overdrafted
the watershed.2 2' In 1991, the Mojave Water Agency filed a cross-
complaint to determine all of the water rights in the watershed within the
Agency's boundaries.224
It is estimated that the watershed has been in overdraft since the early
1950's and that the annual overdraft is between 70,000 and 90,000 acre
feet.2" Water use in the adjudicated area has traditionally been for
agriculture, although in the past twenty years rapid urbanization has
occurred. The municipalities in the upper watershed initially sought an
assessment on every acre foot of water produced, a so-called "gross pump
221. Wright v. Goleta Water Dist., 174 Cal. App. 3d 74, 86, 219 Cal. Rptr. 740, 749 (1985).
222. Id. at 87, 219 Cal. Rptr. at 749.
223. Judgment Pursuant to Stipulation at 1, City of Barstow v. City of Adelanto, No. 208568 (Riverside
Sup. Ct. Sept. 22, 1993). At this time the proposed judgment has only been entered as to the stipulating parties
and there may be a trial involving the rights of the non-stipulating parties that could impact the terms of the
proposed judgment. Id.
224. IdU at 2.
225. JONES & SToKEs AssocIATEs, INC., MOJAVE WATER AGENCY REGIONAL WATER MANAGEMENT
PLAN DRAFr ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT REPORT 2-9 (Feb. 1994) (copy on file with the Pacific Law Journal).
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t. '2 2 6 The effect of a gross pump tax would have been to quickly
eliminate virtually all agriculture in the region. A more equitable "net
pump tax" was eventually agreed upon, which gives all producers a base
annual production right determined by the highest annual amount produced
by the producer in the five years before the initial complaint was filed.227
All producers agreed to a ratcheting down of this production amount by
five percent per year for four years after an initial year.228 Producers will
still be able to produce their base production right but will have to pay an
assessment on it.?2 Thus, after five years all producers will have a free
production allowance of eighty percent of their base annual production
right.230 After that time, the free production allowance may either
increase or decrease, based on a determination of the overdraft in the
producer's subarea.23'
The judgment is based on the availability of supplemental water, which
is water imported by the Mojave Water Agency pursuant to its contract
with the Department of Water Resources for State Water Project water,
i.e., other water brought into the watershed or production foregone by
existing producers. z 2 To raise money for the purchase of supplemental
water, the judgment calls for two primary assessments. The first is a
replacement water assessment levied against each producer's production
in excess of its free production allowance. 3 The second is a makeup
water assessment to be levied against each acre-foot of production not
assessed a replacement water assessment.2m This assessment is intended
to satisfy obligations to other subareas that are established within the
judgment.235 There is also an administrative assessment and an
assessment against producers of less than ten acre-feet who are otherwise
226. Author's Litigation Notes, City of Barstow v. City of Adelanto, No. 208568 (on file with the Pacific
Law Journal).
227. Judgment Pursuant to Stipulation at 38, City of Barstow v. City of Adelanto, No. 208568 (Riverside
Sup. CL Sept. 22, 1993); see id. at 7-8 (stating that the base annual production right is determined by the highest
yearly production by the producer between 1986 and 1990).
228. Id. at 27.
229. See id at 38-42 (describing the procedure for levying assessments).
230. Id at 27.
231. Judgment Pursuant to Stipulation at 27-28, City of Barstow v. City of Adelanto, No. 208568,
(Riverside Sup. Ct. Sept. 22, 1993).
232. Id. at 40; see id. at 13 (defining supplemental water).
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not subject to the provisions of the judgment. 6 The judgment also has
an apparently unique and somewhat revolutionary biological resource
assessment. Although the judgment has as a goal the maintenance of water
levels for the protection of endangered species and riparian habitat, if those
water levels are not met, an assessment of fifty cents can be levied against
every acre-foot of production to create a trust fund (not to exceed one
million dollars) to be used to purchase water and maintain resource
areas.
237
The proposed judgment also provides for water transfers. 2 8 Any
production right (the judgment treats all types of production produced
under different water rights as the same) may be transferred. Under these
rules, an agricultural user can transfer a production right to an urban user
on an acre-foot for acre-foot basis. 39 Thus, the proposed judgment
accomplished what at many points seemed impossible. It provides for an
orderly transition from agricultural to urban water use and a method for
compensating those farmers that no longer choose to farm, as well as
including a method for protecting the natural resources of the area.
Relying on increased adjudication of groundwater disputes would
certainly be easier than attempting to push a comprehensive regulatory
program through the legislature and past powerful water interests. In
addition, courts have the flexibility to take an individual approach to each
problem and tailor a remedy that seems to be best for the particular basin.
However, there are numerous shortcomings to such an approach.240 For
instance, the costs in terms of time and money are high, as all individuals
with a potential water right to each basin must be brought into the
process.24' More importantly, "the conclusion of one court as to the best,
most pragmatic solution may not be the most efficient management
solution. 242 Since a court must adjudicate the rights of the parties to the
case, it cannot consider the overall state interest in managing a scarce
236. See id. (providing that producers who do not produce in a given year must pay the amount paid by
minimal producers for that year); see also id. at 9-10 (defining a minimal producer as a person whose base
annual production is not greater than ten acre-feet).
237. kL at 39.
238. Id. at F-1.
239. Id.
240. See supra notes 212-222 and accompanying text (explaining the disadvantages to adjudicating water
rights).
241. See Deborah A. de Lambert, Comment, District Management for California's Groundwater, 11
ECOLOGY L.Q. 373, 374 (1984) (discussing the inefficiency and problems with relying on litigation in
groundwater management disputes).
242. Michael P. Mallery, Comment, Groundwater: A Call for a Comprehensive Management Program,
14 PAC. L. 1279, 1290 (1983).
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resource.243 Finally, judicial solutions are an inherently after-the-fact,
piecemeal approach to solving resource management problems, which
leave the state of the law uncertain.
B. Federal Control
A system of comprehensive groundwater management could be
administered by the federal government. However, given the federal
government's current preoccupation with changes to the Clean Water Act
and the Endangered Species Act, any comprehensive federal groundwater
management in the near future is extremely unlikely. Actually, federal
government regulation of groundwater has already begun to occur through
the enforcement of the federal Endangered Species Act (ESA).244 Thus
far, California has only felt the bite of the ESA in the San Joaquin-
Sacramento Delta where the listing of the delta smelt and the winter run
chinook salmon have curtailed surface water diversions. Unless California
develops some method to control and prevent the overdraft of its
groundwater basins, federal control of groundwater through the ESA may
suddenly become a harsh reality. For an example of how continued
inaction could lead to draconian federal regulation of the state's resources,
groundwater users in California need only consider the recent experience
of Texas and its depletion of the Edwards Aquifer. 4 5
The Edwards Aquifer is the City of San Antonio's sole source of
water.246 Authorities knew as early as the 1950's that the aquifer faced
overdraft problems, but they were unable to develop a management plan
for the area.247 In the 1980's, excessive pumping reduced springflows at
springs which provide habitats for several species listed under the
ESA.248 In 1989, the Sierra Club filed a lawsuit charging that the U.S.
Fish and Wildlife Service (USFWS) was violating the ESA by failing to
control pumpihg from the Edwards Aquifer. 249
243. Id.
244. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1543 (1988).
245. Sierra Club v. Interior Dept., 36 ERC 1533, 1548 (W.D. Tex. 1993) (holding that pumping controls
were necessary to save threatened species from extinction); WATER STRATEGIST, TEXAS REGULATES TH1
EDWARDS AQUIFER 1 (July 1993).
246. WATER STRATEGIST, supra note 245, at I.
247. Id. at 2.
248. Id. at 7.
249. Id.
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In 1993, a federal district judge ruled in favor of the Sierra Club,
holding that pumping controls were necessary to save threatened species
from extinction.250 The judge noted that no such controls were in place
as of 1993, despite the fact that in 1989 the USFWS had decided against
using the "blunt axe" of federal intervention because Texas assured the
USFWS that the state would "quickly" establish its own pumping
controls." The judge blamed the state's continued inaction on political
disputes and on the fact that "those who benefit by unregulated pumping
do not believe pumping will be limited to protect endangered species. 252
Finally, the judge issued the following ultimatum: "The next session of the
Texas [L]egislature offers the last chance for adoption of an adequate state
plan before the 'blunt axes' of Federal intervention have to be
dropped.2
53
The scolding finally spurred Texas to action. It took a court decision
and the threat of federal control to bring it about, but the Texas Legislature
finally created a statewide authority to limit pumping from the aquifer.'
The legislature passed a bill creating the Edwards Aquifer Authority and
providing the agency with complete management authority over pumping
from Edwards Aquifer."55 The bill also set provisional short-term targets
for annual pumpage, which the Authority is to meet through its permitting
powers. 6
The Edwards Aquifer case should be a warning to those who would
resist efforts in California to establish more state authority over
groundwater pumping. The current "pump until you are sued" system
simply begs for conservation problems that provide the federal government
with an excuse to get involved in local matters. True, the federal judge in
Texas provided local authorities with a second chance. However, as one
author warns, "the possibility of retaining local power should not be taken
for granted." 257 Texas was able to act quickly because it had foreseen the
potential for difficulty as early as 1989 and therefore already had a
250. Sierra Club v. Interior Dept., 36 ERC 1533, 1548 (W.D. Tex. 1993).
251. Id. at 1550.
252. Id. at 1554.
253. Id.
254. WATER ST"RAahIST, supra note 245, at 12.
255. Id. at 11.
256. Id.
257. Id. at 12.
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management strategy developed."5 8 Pumpers in California will not be so
lucky if they continue to bury their heads in the sand.
C. Local Control
Another future option for groundwater regulation is the continued local
control of groundwater by counties, cities or other special districts. As
discussed earlier, providing for such local controls has been the
legislature's recent method of choice."5 9 This option allows local input
and flexibility regarding how groundwater should best be allocated to the
competing interests in the specific area. In a state such as California,
which encompasses a large and hydrologically diverse area, such
specialized attention to the different needs of different areas is essential.
Authorities in New Mexico and Arizona simply do not have to deal with
the number of issues and competing geographical interests which exist in
California.
However, there are several reasons why the system of local
administration cannot do the job alone. First, local controls often create
inconsistent regulations, which is especially problematic because
groundwater basins invariably extend beyond the boundaries of manmade
political subdivisions.2' 6 Second, local bodies almost uniformly lack the
enforcement powers and funding necessary to manage a resource as vast
and essential as groundwater. 261 For example, Assembly Bill 3030 may
not allow local entities to limit groundwater extractions. 262 Moreover,
local regulations may violate the commerce clause if restrictions on the
258. Id.
259. See supra notes 87-133 and accompanying text (discussing local government management of
groundwater).
260. de Lambert, supra note 241, at 396; Mallery, supra note 242, at 1294. In addition, several different
agencies with different powers and goals may conflict within one local district. de Lambert, supra note 241, at
396.
261. See supra notes 124-125 and accompanying text (stating that local entities may not be able to regulate
groundwater under their police powers). For example, one commentator notes:
The absence of adequate resource management and conservation efforts in water poor areas of the
state has been one factor causing rich areas to resist water transfers; residents of water rich areas
sense that better management and increased conservation efforts could forestall the need for expensive
new water projects. A clear state policy requiring proper water use state-wide [would] ease concerns
and prompt cooperation.
de Lambert, supra note 241, at 397-98.
262. 1992 Cal. Legis. Serv. ch. 947, sec. 2 (enacting CAL. WATER CODE §§ 10750-10767).
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transfer of groundwater out of the area discriminate against interstate
commerce.
263
Local agencies acting alone cannot solve statewide problems, which
must be handled in a consistent manner, rather than through a
checkerboard of management controls. This is a particular problem because
of the regional differences in California. For example, in northern
California, groundwater regulation has concentrated on the protection of
basins from exports, while in southern California the focus has been on the
quantification of water rights and the importation of supplemental water
so that production can be maintained or increased. In some situations, such
as the Inyo County ordinance, local controls serve to disfavor outsiders
over local residents. Another issue that has not been addressed is storage
of local water in groundwater basins. Finally, local entities, with differing
constituents, political agendas and purposes, would undoubtedly have
difficulty cooperating to effectuate a statewide solution to the problem.
D. State Control
In order to manage this dwindling resource most efficiently, California
must adopt some scheme of state control of groundwater.264 The SWRCB
already regulates the use and allocation of most surface water and is
responsible for enforcing Article X, Section 2 of the California
Constitution." Furthermore, the federal government has shown
deference to the State in water law issues.2  Unlike local public entities,
the State has the financial resources necessary to adequately analyze the
statewide problems and could possibly facilitate groundwater transfers and
imports into those basins that are overdrafted. The State also has the
enforcement authority necessary to ensure that the management scheme is
implemented and followed. Finally, the State is equipped to oversee and
coordinate local efforts and thereby reduce the current uncertainty with
respect to groundwater management.
263. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (granting Congress the power to regulate interstate commerce). In
Sphorhase v. Nebraska, the Supreme Court held that groundwater was considered an article of commerce, and
Nebraska's regulation of groundwater exports was therefore subject to Commerce Clause scrutiny. Sphorhase
v. Nebraska, 458 U.S. 941, 953 (1982).
264. This suggestion is by no means a new one; rather, it is simply an ignored one. See generally de
Lambert, supra note 241, at 373-400 (describing. how California should attain state control over groundwater);
Mallery, supra note 242, at 1279-1307 (explaining that California needs to enact some state control of
groundwater).
265. See supra notes 73-86 and accompanying text (discussing the SWRCB's regulation of surface water).
266. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(g) (1988).
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California does not lack a variety of models from which to pick and
choose elements of its regulatory scheme. Several western states, including
Arizona,267  New Mexico, 2' Oklahoma2 69  and Colorado,27 °  have
extensive, yet different, programs in place. Certainly, California has its
own unique problems and characteristics, and the legislature will have to
decide how far along the "regulatory spectrum" it must (or can) proceed
in order to create an effective, yet acceptable, system. As noted above, the
diversity of California's water interests will certainly not allow the State
to implement a regime as centralized as New Mexico's because California
must retain a large measure of local flexibility.
From the beginning of any serious attempt to create a statewide system
of groundwater management, the legislature must recognize that pumpers
will be hostile to centralized administration, and the legislature must
seriously address their concerns.271 For example, the primary concerns
of agricultural pumpers have been that regulating groundwater will
increase their costs and that it is unnecessary because additional surface
supplies will become available.272 However, it is very unlikely that
significant additional surface supplies will become available given
increased demands and environmental restrictions. The pumpers must
overcome their fears of losing local control and recognize that the current
situation is too destructive to last forever.273 It makes no sense for
pumpers to put off their day of reckoning until even more groundwater
basins are in overdraft and their backs are against the wall. California has
the opportunity now to review several different options for a statewide
groundwater management system, learn from other states' mistakes, and
craft a plan that meets the state's groundwater needs. It should not pass on
this opportunity any longer.
267. See supra notes 180-206 and accompanying text (describing Arizona's regulatory scheme).
268. See supra notes 159-179 and accompanying text (explaining New Mexico's form of regulation).
269. See Mallery, supra note 242, at 1302-04 (arguing for the adoption of Oklahoma's scheme in
California).
270. See CoLo. REV. STAT. §§ 37-90-101 to 37-90-141 (West 1973 & Supp. 1993) (providing the
Colorado Ground Water Management Act).
271. Smith, supra note 167, at 686-87.
272. Id.
273. See de Lambert, supra note 241, at 398-99 (discussing objections to centralized control).
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